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XII TIIE SUPREMO COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

PIONEER STATE BANK, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Case No. 2034G

vs.
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS,
RAY M. MAAG, ROCKf MOUNTAIN
TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, and THE
TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY,
a corporation,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Defendants and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit error in determining that

Pioneer State Bank is not entitled to recover under the subject
policy of title insurance because a payment of $77,000 made by
Title Guarantee Company to Pioneer State BanK in February 1982
to settle claims made on other policies of third parties must be
credited toward the face amount of Pioneer's $77,000 policy?
2.

Did the District Court commit error in determining

that Pioneer is not entitled to recover general and
consequential damages for the fraud of Defendants in issuing a
fraudulent title policy and later failing to disclose and
concealing Pioneer's claim under that policy?

3.

Did the trial court commit error in determining that

Pioneer is not entitled to recover from Title Guarantee for
Title Guarantee's bad faith refusal to settle to Pioneer's claim
on the insurance policy?
4.

Did the trial court commit error in determining that

Pioneer had failed to mitigate its damages?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

The Proceedings Below.

This action was commenced by Pioneer State Bank, formerly
known as Western Home Bank ("Pioneer"), to recover compensatory
and punitive damages against Defendants for breach of a policy
of title insurance, fraud and a bad faith refusal to pay
Pioneer's claim under the insurance policy.

The case went to

trial before the Court, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, on
June 20 and June 21, 1934.

Judgment was thereafter entered in

favor of all Defendants and against Pioneer, no cause of action,
on November 9, 1984. [R. 442-443]
B

*

Statement of Facts.

On or about October 4, 1979, Pioneer made a loan in the
amount of $70,000 to Defendant Dennis Church ("Church"),
Defendant Jay Lewis ("Lewis"), Ray Maag and Douglas Church
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "borrowers").

2

1

Prior to trial, Defendant Ray Maag was dismissed as a
party pursuant to stipulation of counsel.

2

Prior to the filing of this action, Douglas Church
filed Bankruptcy proceedings and was not named as a
party herein.
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That loan was secured by a Trust Deed executed by the borrowers
conveying to Pioneer a second lien on the Lake Meadows
Suodivision in Provo, Utah ("Lake Meadows"), and a first lien on
two Willowbrook condominium units in Provo, Utah. [R. 466, Ex,
P-l]

The borrowers were the sole shareholders, officers and

directors of Rocky Mountain Title and Abstract Company ("Rocky
Mountain").

Rocky Mountain was the duly authorized local agent

for Title Guarantee Company ("Title Guarantee"). [R. 571, 699]
In order to induce Pioneer to make the loan, the
borrowers told Pioneer that Lake Meadows was an approved
subdivision and gave to Pioneer a copy of the subdivision plat
showing that the subdivision was, in fact, approved by Provo
City days before the loan was made. [Ex. P-4]
As a condition to approving the Lake Meadows Subdivision,
Provo City had required two accesses to the subdivision.

The

main access to the subdivision was from Geneva Road over certain
property owned by Mr. and Mrs. John Taylor (the "Taylor
property").

The borrowers had been negotiating with Mr. Taylor

for this property, but as of October 1979 had not been able to
obtain a written agreement or deed from Mr. Taylor for the
conveyance of the property. [R. 615, 625]
The borrowers told Pioneer they needed the loan in order
to develop Lake Meadows.

However, the main purpose of the loan

was to replace trust funds held by Rocky Mountain which had been
wrongfully taken out of the trust account. [R. 560-569, 649]
Because the loan funds were urgently needed, Douglas Church, the
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President of Rocky Mountain, with the prior knowledge of
Defendant Lewis, forged a deed to the Taylor property from Mr.
and Mrs. Taylor to the borrowers and recorded the deed so that
the borrowers could get approval from Provo City for the
subdivision and obtain the loan from Pioneer. [R. 572, 650]
Defendant Church was informed of this forgery within days after
it occurred.

[R. 641, 703, 707]

In early October, 1979, almost immediately after the
forged deed to the Taylor property was recorded, Mr. Taylor
found out about the forgery, became very angry and the borrov/ers
knew it would be impossible to negotiate further with Taylor to
acquire the Taylor property.

[R. 706-700]

Pioneer had done title business with Rocky Mountain prior
to the borrov/ers seeking a loan. [R. 467]
making the loan, Pioneer required

As a condition of

that a lender's policy of

title insurance be issued in its favor. [R. 471]

A lender's

policy of title insurance was, in fact, issued by Title
Guarantee through its duly authorized agent, Rocky Mountain, on
or about November 19, 1979, insuring Pioneer's trust deed in
second position on Lake Meadows behind a first trust deed in
favor of Utah Valley Bank and insuring Pioneer's Trust Deed in
first position on the two condominium units. [Ex. P-3]

A copy

of the title policy is attached as an Addendum to this Brief.
The title policy misrepresented that the borrowers owned the
Taylor property and failed to disclose Taylor's interest in the
property or the forgery or the fact that the subdivision did not
have the two accesses required by Provo City.
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Uoae of the

Defendants ever informed Pioneer of any of these facts. [R.
476-477, 550# 554, 561, 571-572, 650]

Pioneer would not have

made the loan had it known of these facts. [R. 401]
In March, 1980, Mr. Taylor commenced a quiet title action
on the Taylor property, naming the borrowers, Rocky Mountain,
Provo City and Pioneer as Defendants. [R. 573; Ex. P-6]

Pioneer

did not know about this lawsuit and there is absolutely no
evidence that Pioneer was ever served with the Summons and
Complaint. [R. 477-479, 527-520, 544-545, 554]

In order to

resolve the matter with Mr. Taylor and keep Pioneer from finding
out about the forgery, Douglas Church went to Pioneer's offices
in the Spring of 1900 and requested Kent Nelson, the Bank
officer in charge of the subject loan, to execute a Partial
Reconveyance of Pioneer's trust deed.

Mr. Nelson testified that

Douglas Church told him that the property covered by the Partial
Reconveyance was not, in fact, part of Pioneer's security and
would have no effect on Pioneer's security position. [R.
474-475, 541-542]

Mr. Nelson wrote this information on the copy

of the Partial Reconveyance which he placed in Pioneer's file.
[R 474-475; Ex. P-5]

Although Douglas Church denied he made

those representations to Mr. Nelson,

Douglas Church admitted he

failed to inform Mr. Nelson that the Taylor property was covered
by the Partial Reconveyance or that the Taylor property was, in
fact, the property providing the main access to the subdivision,
or that the deed to the Taylor property had been forged in order
to get the subdivision approved, and that without the Taylor
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property Lake Meadows was not a legal subdivision and could not
be developed. [R. 574]

Douglas Church further admitted he acted

like the reconveyance was "no big deal" because he was afraid
Pioneer might find out what was happening and immediately call
the loan due. [R. 576, 573-579]

Mr. llelson did, in fact, sign

the Partial Reconveyance. [R. 474; Ex. P-5]
After the quiet title action was filed, Mr. Taylor
unilaterally dismissed that lawsuit against Pioneer without
prejudice.

Pioneer did not and was not required to consent to

the dismissal because it had never been served with the Summons
and Complaint.

In September 1900, the borrowers and Rocky

Mountain resolved the quiet title action with Mr. Taylor by
stipulating to a Judgment that the borrowers had no right, title
or interest in the Taylor property, that the title to the Taylor
property was vested in Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and that the
borrowers made no claim whatsoever to any interest to the Taylor
property. [Ex. P-7]

Pioneer was never informed of the Judgment

which was entered in the Taylor lawsuit based on the borrowers1
Stipulation. [R. 470-430]
The borrowers subsequently defaulted on both their loan
with Pioneer

and their loan with Utah Valley Bank which was

secured by a first lien on the Lake Meadows property.
Accordingly, in mid-1901, both Utah Valley Bank and Pioneer
commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on their
collateral. [R. 400, 403-404; Exs. P-21, 22, 23]

On December

11, 1901, Utah Valley Bank conducted a Trustee's Sale of its
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first trust deed on Lake Meadows.

Without knowledge of the

forged deed or the fact that the Taylor property was not/ in
fact/ owned by the borrov/ers/ and the subdivision could not be
developed/ Pioneer purchased Lake Meadows at the Trustee1s Sale
for the total sun of $01/631.13. [R. 404; Ex. P-9]
Shortly after the subject loan was made by Pioneer to the
borrowers in 1979/ the borrov/ers caused Rocky Mountain to issue
two other policies of title insurance insuring the two
Willowbrook Condominium units which served as partial security
for Pioneer's loan.

One title policy was issued in favor of

Pinecrest Associates in the sum of £130/000.00/ insuring
Pinecrest Associates in first position on the condominium units.
[Ex. P-29]

The other title policy was issued in favor of the

Lockhart Company in the amount of $30/000.00, insuring the
Lockhart Company in first position on these condominium
3
units. [Ex. P-30] Rocky Mountain intentionally failed to
disclose on these two title policies the Pioneer lien which v/as,
in fact/ in first position on both condominium units. [R.
637-G30]
After purchasing Lake Meadov/s at the Utah Valley 3ank
Trustee's Sale, Pioneer proceeded with its non-judicial
foreclosure of the two Willowbrook Condominium units. [R. 540;
Ex. P-24]

Shortly thereafter and in January, 1902, both

In fact. Pioneer was in first position/ Lockhart in
second position and Pinecrest in third position on the
condominiums.
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Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart made claims under their title
policies against Title Guarantee on the basis that they had

been

insured in first position on the condominiums and the prior lien
of Pioneer had not been disclosed. [R. G67-663]

David Hodgson,

one of the attorneys for Title Guarantee in the present lawsuit,
was retained by Title Guarantee to investigate the claims of
Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart. [R. 667-660]
During the course of his investigation, Mr. Hodgson was
told by Provo City of the forged deed and the access problem on
the Taylor property. [R. 673-674]

He was also informed of the

access problem in January 1902 by the attorney for Pinecrest
Associates. [R. 672-673; Ex. P-14]

In fact, Douglas Church had

told Title Guarantee about the forged deed and access problem
back in the Summer or Fall of 1901. [R. 596-597]

Title

Guarantee did not inform Pioneer of what it had learned. [R. 561
600]

Rather, in order to settle the claims with respect to the

condominiums made by Pinecrest Associates on its £130,000 title
policy and Lockhart on its $30,000 title policy, and with the
intent of trying to deprive Pioneer of any future claim which
Title Guarantee feared would be made on Lake Meadows when
Pioneer found out about the forged deed and the access problem,
Title Guarantee paid off Pioneer's lien on the two condominium
units on February 17, 1902, in the amount of £77,326.90. [R.
674-676, 693-694]

Title Guarantee did not pay Pioneer any sums

under Pioneer's title policy or pay any of the £01,631.39
Pioneer had paid in December 1901 to purchase Lake Meadows. [R.
601, 729-732]
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When Title Guarantee paid Pioneer the £77,000 to satisfy
Pioneer's lien on the condominium units. Title Guarantee
requested and was given by Pioneer the original Promissory Note
signed by the borrowers, a Partial Assignment of Pioneer's trust
deed (which Assignment expressly excluded Pioneer's interest in
Lake Meadows) and the original title policy.

Title Guarantee

did not tell Pioneer that it wanted the policy to try to avoid
the future claim which it feared Pioneer would make on the Lake
Meadows property.

Pioneer was never asked to, nor did Pioneer

agree to waive or relinquish any rights on its title policy with
respect to LaKe Meadows. [R. 560, 677-679, 632-634]
Pioneer subsequently found out about the forged deed and
access problem and filed a claim with Title Guarantee under
Pioneer's title insurance policy on May 26, 1932. [Ex. P-10]

On

July 29, 1932, over two months after the claim was made, Title
Guarantee denied the claim on two grounds:

(1) Pioneer's

purchase of the Lake Meadows property at the Utah Valley Bank
Trustee's Sale extinguished Pioneer's Trust Deed on that
property and therefore purportedly extinguished the insurance
coverage under the policy; and (2) Title Guarantee asserted it
had already paid Pioneer $77,326.98 under Pioneer's policy so
that Title Guarantee had already fully paid the face amount of
the policy.
Because of the forged deed and lack of adequate access to
the subdivision, Lake Meadows is not a valid subdivision and
Provo City will not allow development of the property. [R. 570,
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574-575]

As a proximate result of the lack of the access over

the Taylor property, Pioneer was damaged in the amount of
$100,000, representing the difference between the value of the
propety as a subdivision of $144,000 and the actual value of the
property of £36,000. [R. 749-751]

In addition, Pioneer suffered

consequential damages of $20,451.39, representing the taxes
actually assessed on the property as a subdivision, and the
taxes that would have been assessed if the property had not been
a subdivision. [R. 752-753, 765-756]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Title Guarantee breached its policy of title

insurance and is liable to Pioneer for the $70,000 face amount
of the policy plus interest.

Pioneer's interest in Lake Meadows

was at all times fully insured by Title Guarantee.

The policy

insured title to the Taylor property and adequate access to Lake
Meadows.

Pioneer's title policy remained in full force and

effect pursuant to the specific provisions of the title policy
after Pioneer purchased the Lake Meadows subdivision at Utah
Valley Bank's Trustee's Sale.

No payments have ever been

to Pioneer under that title policy.

made

The $70,000 payment made by

Title Guarantee to Pioneer in February 1902, was made to release
Pioneer's lien on the Willowbrook Condominiums in order to
resolve claims on the other policies Title Guarantee had issued
to Lockhart and Pinecrest Associates on the Willowbrook
Condominiums and can't be credited toward Pioneer's policy.
Pioneer never made any claim on those condominiums, and in fact,
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had no claim to maKe on the condominiums because Pioneer was in
first position.
2.

Rocky Mountain, Church and Lewis defrauded Pioneer by

issuing a title policy which misrepresented that the borrowers
owned the Taylor property and failed to disclose the forged
deed, that the borrowers did not own the Taylor property and
that Lake Meadows was not, in fact, a valid subdivision and
could not be developed.

Title Guarantee is liable for the fraud

of its duly authorized agents.
3.

Title Guarantee defrauded Pioneer by intentionally

failing to disclose to Pioneer the forged deed and access
problems and by seeking to extinguish the policy of title
insurance on Lake Meadows when Title Guarantee paid money to
Pioneer in February 1902 to settle claims made by third parties
on other policies on the condominiums.
4.

Title Guarantee is liable to Pioneer for acting in

bad faith in refusing to settle Pioneer's claim on spurious
grounds.
5.

Pioneer did not fail to mitigate its damages by

seeking alternative accesses, and in any event, Defendants did
not plead failure to mitigate as a defense.
ARGUMENT
A.

PIOIJEER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM TITLE GUARANTEE

FOR BREACH OF THE TITLE POLICY.
It is undisputed that the lender's title policy issued to
Pioneer by Title Guarantee through Rocky Mountain on November
19, 1931, insured that the borrowers owned the Taylor property
suoject only to the first lien of Utah Valley Bank and insured
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that Lake Meadows had adequate access.
in fact, own the Taylor property.

The borrowers did not,

Rather, Douglas Church, with

knowledge of the other borrowers, knowingly forged a deed to the
Taylor property so that the Subdivision could be approved and
the loan from Pioneer ootained.

The borrowers subsequently

stipulated to a Judgment that the Taylor property was in fact
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and the borrowers had no interest
in that property.
Where title to a portion of an insured property fails,
the general measure of damages is the diminution in value of the
entire tract and not just the fair market value of the portion
of the property to which title failed.

See, e.g., Clements v.

Stewart Title Guarantee Co., 537 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. 1975); llartman
v. Shambaugh, 630 P. 2d 7 50 (LI.M. 1931); Qverholtzer v. northern
Counties Title Ins. Co., 253 P.2d 116 (Calif. 1953); Ranchers
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers F & II Ins. Co. of Alabama, 190 S.2d 397
(Miss. 1966); Couch on Ins., 2d, Sec. 57:179.

In addition, the

insured is entitled to recover consequential damages which were
foreseeable, including those damages caused oy special
circumstances of which the breaching party was aware.

See,

e.g., Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Ut. 1953); Buquo v. Title Guarantee
and Trust, 100 S.W. 2d 997 (Tenn. 1937); Hartman v. Shambaugh,
supra.; Burks v. Louisville Title Ins. Co., 121 LI.E.2d 943 (Ohio
1953);

Couch on Ins., 2d, Sec 57:175.
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The fair market value of Lake Meadows as a subdivision is
$144,000, whereas the actual value of Lake Meadows because it is
not a valid subdivision is only $36,000.

Pioneer also suffered

consequential damages in the further sum of $20,451.39 because
of the fact, known all along by the borrowers, that although
Lake Meadows could not be developed as a subdivision, the
property was nevertheless taxed as a subdivision.

Pioneer is

entitled to recover the full amount of these damages, up to the
$70,000 face amount of the policy, plus interest from Title
Guarantee.
Title Guarantee attempted to avoid its obligations on the
policy by denying Pioneer's claim in July 1902 on two grounds:
(1) that Pioneer's purchase of Lake Meadows at Utah Valley
Bank's Trustee's Sale purportedly extinguished Pioneer's Trust
Deed on the property and, thus, supposedly extinguished
Pioneer's policy of title insurance; and (2) that in February,
1902, Title Guarantee fully paid the policy by paying Pioneer
Bank in excess of $77,000 under Pioneer's policy.

Apparently

recognizing that these grounds were frivolous, Title Guarantee
attempted to raise in this action two additional grounds for
denying Pioneer's claim, that is, that the title policy only
remained in effect as long as the borrowers owed Pioneer a debt
so that when that debt was paid in February 1902, the title
policy was extinguished regardless of whether Pioneer was ever
paid anything under its policy; and that when Title Guarantee
requested and received from Pioneer the original title policy in
February 1902, the title policy was extinguished.
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The trial court did not adopt any of the grounds asserted
by Title Guarantee for denying Pioneer's claim, but nevertheless
concluded that Pioneer was not entitled to recover on the title
policy.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that

although the £77,000 payment by Title Guarantee to Pioneer in
February 1932, was not paid to Pioneer under Pioneer's policy as
argued by Title Guarantee, the payment made by Title Guarantee
on other policies insuring Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart's
position on the two Willowbrook Condominium units somehov/ can be
credited to Title Guarantee's obligations under Pioneer's policy
and therefore, satisfied Title Guarantee's obligation on
Pioneer's policy. [R. 426]
It is respectfully submitted, for the reasons hereinafter
set forth, that the original grounds asserted by Title Guarantee
for denying Pioneer's claim are frivolous, that Title Guarantee
is precluded from asserting additional grounds in this lawsuit
for denying the claim, and that in any event, the additional
grounds asserted are without merit.
1.

Pioneer's Policy Was Clearly Still in Effect After

Pioneer Acquired the Lake Meadows Property.
Pioneer's acquisition of Lake Meadows at Utah Valley
Bank's Trustee's Sale did not extinguish Pioneer's the title
policy.
Paragraph 2(a) of the policy [Ex.

P-3] expressly

provides that the insurance remains in effect after Pioneer
acquires title to the property:
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"Continuance of Insurance After Acquisition of
Title. This policy shall continue in force as of
date of policy in favor of an insured who acquires
all or any part of the estate or interest in the
land described in Schedule A oy foreclosure,
trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure,
or other legal manner which discharges the lien of
the insured mortgage . . . "
Further, paragraph 2(b) of the policy provides that:
"The coverage of this policy shall continue in
force so long as such insured retains an
estate or interest in the land . . . "
This language clearly affords coverage in the present
case.

In fact, the whole purpose of a lender's title policy is

to insure the lender that if the borrowers fail to pay the loan
and the lender acquires the property through foreclosure, that
the lender will have good title to the property.
Further, David Hodgson, the attorney who investigated and
denied the claim on behalf of Title Guarantee and represented
Title Guarantee in this case, admitted in his testimony at trial
that Pioneer's coverage remained in effect after Pioneer
purchased Lake Meadows. [R. 606-690]

The language of the policy

and the admission of Mr. Hodgson end the controversy.4

Even if the court were to find that the policy was
ambiguous in this regard, ambiguities in an insurance
policy are construed strictly against the insured.
Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews &
Sons, 665 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1903).
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2.

The Payment Made By Title Guarantee To Pioneer Was

Not Made Under Pioneer's Policy And Cannot Be Credited Against
That Policy,
The second ground siezed upon by Title Guarantee in
attempting to deny coverage to Pioneer ./as that the February
1902 payment of £77,000 (more than the amount of Pioneer's
policy) made by Title Guarantee to Pioneer was allegedly made
under Pioneer's policy, thus extinguishing any further liability
to Pioneer under the policy.

This contention ignores reality

and was rejected by the trial court.
As of Feoruary 1902, Pioneer owned Lake Meadows.

In

addition, Pioneer still had a first lien on the two Willowbrook
Condominiums as security for the $77,000 debt owed to Pioneer by
the borrowers.

The evidence is undisputed that Pioneer never

made a claim under its title policy on the two Willowbrook
condominiums and Pioneer never had any claim that it could have
made under that title policy on the two Willoworook condominiums
because Pioneer was, in fact, in first position on the
condominiums.

The $77,000 payment made by Title Guarantee to

Pioneer had absolutely nothing to do with Pioneer's policy.
Rather, the evidence was undisputed that the borrowers
and Rocky Mountain had fraudulently issued two other policies of
title insurance insuring both Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart
in first position on the same condominium units.

Both Pinecrest

Associates and Lockhart made claims on their policies against
Title Guarantee.

Title Guarantee paid Pioneer the $77,000 to

resolve the title problems on the Pinecrest Associates and
Lockhart policies.
-16-

There is simply no support, legal or factual, for the
trial court's conclusion that the $77,000 payment can be
credited to the Pioneer policy.

Pioneer did not need or request

protection under the title policy with respect to the
Willowbrook condominiums.

Pioneer was insured in first position

and was, in fact, in first position.

It was only Pinecrest

Associates and Lockhart who needed and were entitled to
protection under their policies.

If Title Guarantee had not

paid Pioneer in order to clear Pioneer's lien from the
Willowbrook condominiums, Pioneer would simply have sold the
condominiums at Trustee's Sale, and Title Guarantee would still
have been liable for the Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart
claims as well as Pioneer's claim on Lake Meadows.

Title

Guarantee cannot erase Pioneer's protection on Lake Meadows by
paying off on other title policies.
3.

Title Guarantee Is Precluded From Raising Any Other

Grounds For Denying Coverage Other Than Stated At The Time
Coverage Was Denied.
A number of courts have held that once an insurance
company denies coverage on a specified ground, the insurance
company may not thereafter in litigation raise any other ground
which a reasonable investigation of the claim would have
uncovered to support its denial of coverage.

See, e.g.,

McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp.
434 (II. D. Calif. 1903); Stone v. Watters, 433 S.W.2d 639 (Miss.
1972); Armstrong v. Hannover Ins. Co. 239 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1972);
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Dillingham Corp, v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co, of
Wisconsin, 503 F.2d, 1101 (9th Cir. 1974).
The rationale of these cases is that an insurance company
has a duty to its insured to thoroughly investigate a claim
before denying it, and if an insurance company is allowed to
defend a suosequent lawsuit on grounds which it first develops
during discovery, the insurance company's incentive to fulfill
its duty to investigate would be significantly reduced.
In the present case, Title Guarantee sought to raise in
this litigation the additional grounds for denying coverage that
the title policy was only in effect so long as a debt was owed
to Pioneer and that by obtaining the original title policy from
Pioneer at the time Title Guarantee paid Pioneer on other
policies in February, 1932, Pioneer's title policy was
extinguished.

Title Guarantee is precluded from raising these

additional grounds because Title Guarantee had full knowledge of
the facts months before Pioneer's claim was made and denied.
4.

The Additional Grounds Asserted by Title Guarantee

for Denying Coverage are Without Merit.
Even if Title Guarantee is entitled to assert in this
litigation additional grounds for denying coverage, the two
additional grounds asserted are without merit.
First, the fact that the debt to Pioneer was paid in
February 1902 is irrelevant.

As of February 1902, Pioneer owned

the Lake Meadows property, having purchased it for approximately
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$01,000 in reliance on the title policy.

Pioneer also had a

first lien on the two Willowbrook condominiums as security for
the $77,000 still owed by the borrowers.

Pioneer's ownership

interest in the Lake Meadows property and lien interest in the
condominiums were both insured under the policy.

The fact that

the debt on the condominiums was paid, and Pioneer's lien on the
condominiums extinguished had no effect on Pioneer's ownership
coverage on Lake Meadows.

Paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the

policy quoted above [Ex. P-3] expressly provide that coverage
continued after Pioneer acquired title to Lake Meadows and as
long as Pioneer "retains an interest or estate" in Lake
Meadows.

Indeed, under Title Guarantee's theory, any time a

lender bids in the full amount of its debt to purchase the
insured property at trustee's sale, the title policy is gone
because the debt no longer exists.
The absurdity of Title Guarantee's argument is
demonstrated by the following hypothetical:

a bank loans

$1,000,000 secured by a Trust Deed on two properties and obtains
a lender's title policy insuring title to the two properties.
The values of the two properties are $950,000 and $50,000,
respectively.

The loan goes into default and the Bank holds a

trustee's sale at which the bank, in reliance on its policy,
purchases the first property for $950,000, leaving the bank as
the owner of the first property with a remaining debt of $50,000
secured by the second property.

The title company realizes

title is defective on the first property so the title company
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voluntarily pays the remaining debt of $50,000.

Under Title

Guarantee's argument, coverage is thereby extinguished and the
bank loses $950,000 because it can make no claim for the title
defect on the first property.

This result is nonsensical, is

directly contradictory to the language of the lender's policy
and was rejected by the trial court.
Second, the fact that Pioneer, at the request of Title
Guarantee, delivered the original title policy to Title
Guarantee in February, 1902, did not extinguish the policy.
trial court rightfully rejected this argument.

The

The evidence is

uncontradicted that at the time Title Guarantee made the $77,000
payment and received the title policy from Pioneer, Title
Guarantee knew of the forged deed and of the access problem, but
intentionally failed to disclose this information to Pioneer
with the intent of attempting to avoid a later claim by Pioneer
on Lake Meadows.

The evidence is further uncontradicted that

Pioneer was neither requested to nor did it agree to waive or
relinquish any rights under the policy with respect to Lake
Meadows.

The subject was simply never discussed.

rights must be intentional.

A waiver of

The trial court did not find nor is

there any evidence that Pioneer waived any rights under the
policy or that the policy was cancelled.
Further, even if Pioneer had waived its rights under the
policy, that waiver was induced by Title Guarantee's intentional
failure to disclose to Pioneer a claim which Pioneer had under
the policy.

Title Guarantee's failure to disclose this
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information clearly constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty
which it owed to Pioneer and any cancellation of the policy was
void.

American Republic Life Ins. Go. v. Claybough, 302 S.W.2d

545 (Ark. 1957); Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 P.2d
252 (Cal. 1940); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group Inc., 155 Cal.Rptr.
843 (1979)

In this regard, because of the fiduciary

relationship between the parties, the burden is upon Title
Guarantee to show that the transaction was understood by Pioneer
and that Title Guarantee's dealings with Pioneer were fair and
in good faith.

Perry v. McConkie, 264 P.2d 052 (Ut. 1953);

Gordon v. Bialystaker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim. Inc., 305 N.E.2d 285
(LI.Y. 1978).
Title Guarantee failed to disclose this information to
Pioneer for one simple reason.

Title Guarantee knew that if it

told Pioneer about the forged deed and the access problem and
that Title Guarantee wanted the title policy to attempt to avoid
any future claims, that Pioneer would have refused to give Title
Guarantee the title policy and would have immediately made a
claim on the policy.
B.

DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PIONEER FOR FRAUDULENTLY

ISSUING THE TITLE POLICY.
The evidence was undisputed at trial that Douglas Church
forged the deed to the Taylor property in order to get approval
of Lake Meadows and obtain the loan from Pioneer.
admittedly knew of the forgery before it occurred.

Lewis
Church knew

of the forgery within a matter of a few days after it occurred.
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notwithstanding this knowledge, none of the borrowers ever
informed Pioneer of the forgery or of the access problem and
knowingly caused Rocky Mountain, which they wholly owned and
controlled, to issue the fraudulent policy of title insurance on
or about November 19, 1979.
In making the loan, Pioneer relied upon the fact that
Lake Meadows was a valid subdivision and that the borrowers had
title to the Taylor property providing access to the
subdivision.

Pioneer would not have made the loan or

subsequently purchased Lake Meadows if Pioneer had known of the
forged deed and access problem.

As a result of the fraud of

Rocky Mountain and the borrowers, Pioneer has been damaged in
the amount of $136,451.39.
Title Guarantee is liable for the actual damages caused
by the fraud of its agent, Rocky Mountain.

A principal is

liable for the fraudulent acts of its agent when acting within
the scope of his actual or apparent authority.
rule applies to insurance companies.

This general

See, e.g., Couch on

Insurance 2d, Insurer's Liability for Agent, Section 25:437.

In

this regard, where a principal entrusts a duty to his agent, the
agent has the implied authority to do all those things which are
within the scope of his assigned duties or reasonably and
necessary incident thereto.

Bowen v. Olsen, 576, P.2d 362 (Ut.

1970); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhursb, 503 P.2d 1216 (Ut.
1972).

Pioneer is entitled to recover all damages suffered as a
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result of the fraud and is not limited to the face amount of the
policy.

Securities Service Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.,

533 P.2d 1217 (Wash. 1970); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1230 (Ut.
1980; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
For example, in Lang v. Security Title & Trust Co., 302
S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1964), the local agent for Security Title
misrepresented that certain property was free and clear when, in
fact, two liens existed on a substantial portion of the
property.

Security Title argued that its liability had to be

measured solely by the provisions of certain title binders which
were issued.

The court rejected this contention, stating:

"It appearing from undisputed evidence that
Post was local agent of Security and that his
complained of acts were done within the scope
of his employment and authority as such agent,
Security is bound thereby and is liable for
the actual damages proximately resulting
therefrom." (Id. at 331.)
In an effort to avoid the consequences of their fraud,
Church and Lewis argued below that at the time the loan was
made, all of the borrowers believed that John Taylor had orally
agreed to a deal whereby he would convey the Taylor property to
the borrowers, that the borrowers thought they had a valid tax
title to the Taylor property and that they had no fraudulent
intent in causing the forged deed to be recorded or in failing
to inform Pioneer of the true facts.

This argument is

unavailing for at least two reasons.
First, all of the borrowers admittedly knew during the
first part of October, 1979, that Taylor had found out about the
recordation of the forged deed, was extremely angry, and that no
deal could be made with Taylor.

Notwithstanding that knowledge,
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approximately a month and a half later, the borrowers caused
Rocky Mountain to issue the fraudulent policy of title
insurance.

The borrowers, as the sole officers, directors and

shareholders of Rocky Mountain, clearly had a fiduciary duty to
disclose the true facts of which they had knowledge when the
title policy was issued.

See, e.g., Eagan v. Mutual of Omaha,

590 P.2d 452 (Gal. 1979); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title
Co., 553 P.2d 254 (Kan. 1976).

Further, even if the borrowers

originally did act on the assumption that they had an oral
agreement with Taylor and that they had a valid tax title, when
they subsequently undeniably learned that they had no deal with
Taylor and stipulated they had no title to the property, they
were required to disclose the true facts to Pioneer regardless
of any fiduciary relationship.
For example, in St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Gonstr.
Co., Inc., 316 N.E.2d 51 (111. 1974), the court observed:
"It is also well established that where one
has made a statement which at that time is
true but subsequently acquires new information
which makes it untrue or misleading, he must
disclose such information to anyone whom he
knows to be acting on the basis of the
original statement — or be guilty of fraud or
deceit." [316 U.E.2d at 71]
To the same effect, see, Mammas v. Pro Valley Townhouses Inc.,
638 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1981); Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d
669, 683 (Calif. 1957); Restatement of Torts 2d, Sec.

551

(2)(c); Prosser's Handbook on the Lav; of Torts, Sec. 106 (4th
Ed. 1971).
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Second, the claim that the borrowers thought they had a
valid tax title to the Taylor property is simply a smokescreen.
No evidence whatsoever was presented below that the borrowers
5
had a valid tax title.
Further, the borrowers admittedly
knew when they obtained the loan from Pioneer that Mr. and Mrs.
Taylor had an interest in the Taylor property. [R. 571-572]
That is obviously why they forged the deed.

In fact, when

Taylor later filed action against the borrowers, the borrowers
made no attempt to defend that action on the basis they had a
tax title but rather stipulated to a judgment determining that
they had no right, title or interest to the Taylor property and
that they made no claim to the Taylor property.

The stipulated

Judgment was entered in October 1900, over a year before Pioneer
purchased Lake Meadows at the Utah Valley Bank Trustee1s Sale in
reliance upon the policy of title insurance.

Pioneer was never

informed of the Judgment to which the oorrowers had stipulated
or of the fact that the borrowers had no title to the Taylor
property.
C.

TITLE GUARANTEE IS LIABLE TO PIOLTEER FOR FAILURE TO

DISCOSE PIONEER'S CLAIM.
It is well settled that an insurance company has a
fiduciary realtionship with its insured and is obligated to
exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with its insured and

The borrowers didn't even know if the property to which
they supposedly had a tax title was all of the Taylor
property which they needed for access. [R. 624]
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in protecting its insured's rights under the policy.

See,

e.g.,

Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576, 579 (Ut. 1967)?
Utah Code Annot., Sec. 31-5-10(4) (1953); Bagan v. Mutual of
Omaha, supra.; Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., supra.
In this regard, a fiduciary has the obligation to disclose all
material facts to the party for whom he is a fiduciary and his
failure to do so constitutes constructive fraud regardless of
his intent.

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 293 (Ut. 1970).

In the present case, Title Guarantee clearly knew of the
forged deed and access problem by at least January of 1982.

In

fact, Douglas Church testified that he told Title Guarantee of
these problems in the Summer or Fall of 1981.

\Jhen Title

Guarantee learned of these problems, it did not seek to protect
Pioneer's interest or disclose the problems to Pioneer, but,
rather, sought solely to protect its own interests by
intentionally not disclosing this information to Pioneer and
seeking to deprive Pioneer of its rights under the policy Dy
obtaining the original title policy from Pioneer.

Title

Guarantee's conduct constituted clear, palpable fraud for which
Pioneer is entitled to recover the full amount of its damages,
not limited by the face amount of the policy.
D.

TITLE GUARANTEE IS LIABLE TO PIONEER FOR ITS BAD

FAITH REFUSAL TO SETTLE PIONEER'S CLAIM.
When an insurance company breaches its obligation of good
faith and acts maliciously, fraudulently and oppresively or in
conscious disregard of the insured's rights in refusing to pay a
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claim, both actual and punitive damages may be awarded against
the insurance company,

Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d

1032 (Gal. 1973); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 532 P.2d 900 (Gal.
1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Go., 271 lT.W.2d 360 (Wise.
1970).

The requisite intent and motivation may be proven either

by direct evidence or by implication from the insurance
company's actions.
fn 7.

ITeal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra. , at 907,

Title Guarantee breached its fiduciary obligation of good

faith to Pioneer when Title Guarantee denied Pioneer's claim on
spurious grounds.
The first ground asserted by Title Guarantee for denying
Pioneer's claim, that Pioneer's acquisition of title to Lake
Meadows extinguished Pioneer's Trust Deed and, therefore, the
title policy, is absolutely rebutted by the express terms of the
title policy set forth above.

Title Guarantee's bad faith in

asserting this ground for denying the claim is further
demonstrated by the admission of their counsel, Mr. Hodgson, who
originally denied the claim, that Pioneer was still covered
under the policy after purchasing Lake Meadows.
The second ground asserted by Title Guarantee, that it
had paid Pioneer £77,000 under Pioneer's policy thereby
extinguishing the policy is likewise baseless.

Title Guarantee

always knew, and the court found, that the $77,000 payment was
not made under Pioneer's policy but was made to resolve the
claims made on the policies issued to Pinecrest Associates and
Lockhart on the condominiums.
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E.

PI QUEER IS HOT BARRCD FROM RECOVERY FOR FAILURE TO

MITIGATE DAMAGES.
The trial court found that Pioneer was barred from
recovery in this action because Pioneer had failed to mitigate
its damages by seeking alternative accesses to develop the
property.

There is absolutely no support in the record -for this

finding.
First, the defense of mitigation of.damages is an
affirmative defense which a defendant must plead and prove.
Pratt v. Bd. of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Ut. 1977).

Hone of the

Defendants ever raised that defense in their pleadings or
presented any evidence to supj^ort that defense at trial.

Thus,

the trial court's finding cannot stand.
Second, the only evidence which was presented at trial
which would go to the mitigation of damages issue was testimony
by Kent Nelson, the Pioneer officer in charge of the subject
loan, that Pioneer had, in fact, attempted to negotiate with
Taylor and to find alternative means of access to the property
in order to ootain approval from Provo City to develop the
property. [R. 84-05]

This evidence was sufficient to show that

Pioneer did, in fact, attempt to mitigate its damages.
COUCLUSIOII
The evidence was simply overwhelming at trial that from
the very beginning the borrowers and Rocky Mountain, and later
Title Guarantee, intentionally misrepresented and concealed the
true facts concerning title to the Lake Meadows property from
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Pioneer and totally ignored their fiduciary obligations to
Pioneer in an attempt to evade their responsibilities to Pioneer
under the title policy.

The title policy has been in effect at

all times, the policy has been

breached and Pioneer has never

received one cent on its policy.
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment of the
trial court should be reversed with directions to enter Judgment
in favor of Pioneer for the sum of $70,000 plus interest on the
breach of contract cause of action and for £136,451.39 plus
interest on the fraud cause of action.

In the alternative, the

Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.
DATED this

tfJJL day of April, 1905.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
By
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ADDENDUM
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I'OT.ICY O F T I T I - K

INSUUANTK

iMiitd by

The Title Guarantee Company
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202
BJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B A N D THE PROTONS OF THE CONDITIONS A N D STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland
poration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the
junt of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys* fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to paj
eunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;
3.

gck of_£jjgJTt^fjccesT to and from the lane

4. L^gmarketability of such title;

~

5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the extent that
such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is
based upon
a. usury, or
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law;
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage;
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material vhich now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, t^ctpt any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of
Policy not financed in ^hole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of
Policy the insured has ad\anced or is obligated to advance; or
8. The invalidity- or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens.
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy:
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction io the dimensions or area of the land, or the efrect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or go\ernmentaI regulation.
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the
public records at Date of Policy.
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mortgage and
not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured
hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy
(except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as to any statutory lien for labor or material).
4. Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent
o^ner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing business" laws of the state in which the land is situated.

WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this poliq' to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a
ating officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws.

The Title Guarantee Company

Issued by
^OCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY
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President
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DATL OK POLICY.

November 1 9 , 1979 a t 11:44 P.M.
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SCHEDULE A

NAME OF INSURED

M >K

AMOUNT

70,000.00

WESTERN HOME BANK

1. The estate or interest in the land identified in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is:

Fee Sijnple
2

The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:
DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, D H 3 J I S G. CHURCH, JAY E . LEWIS, a n d RAY M. MAAG

3

The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows:

A Deed of Trust dated October 4, 1979, executed by D0UGIAS W. CHURCH *
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MAAG as Trustor, to
secure payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of
$70,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to
WESTERN HOME RANK, as Trustee, in favor of WESTESN HOME BANK, a Utah
Corporation, as Beneficiary, recorded November 19, 1979 as Entry
No. 45164 of Official Records.

The land referred to in this policy is described as set forth in the mortgage above mentioned, and identified as follows:

The following described real property is situated in Utah County,
State of Utah, to-wit:
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 1 to 57, inclusive, Plat "A", LAKE MEADOWS
SUBDIVISION, a subdivision, of Provo, Utah, according to the official
plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of Utah
County, State of Utah.
PARCEL 2: F-1455-61-1 Building 4 J Floor 3, Unite B, VttLLOWBROOK HILL
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah.
PARCEL 2: F-l466-61-1 Building 5, Floor 1, Unite D, WILE£WBHD0K HILL
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah.
* *** * *** *

The Title Guarantee Company
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T i n s J*olicy d(^-s not insure against loss or ddmagc by reason of tV»c following
PART

I

1. Taxes or assessments which ire not shown as rxistjn£ liens by the r«urds of any taxing authont> that Irues
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records
2 Any dcti, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records buf which could be ascertained
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which t correct
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water
rights, claims or title to water.
6. Possible unfiled mechanics* and materialmen's liens
7. Trie dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any
individual Insured.

PART II

1*

fexes for the year 1979 now due and payable but will not become
delinquent until November 30, 1979.

2.

Any Special Assessments levied for the year 1979 are shown current,
but this Policy does not insure against possible future Assessments
levied for the balance of the year 1979 and subsequent years.

3.

AFFECTS PARCEL 1: An Easement over and across
August 7, 1978 and executed by CLAVIN GRAY and
favor of UTAH Power and light company recorded
as Entry No. 39800 in Book 1685 at page 711 of

4.

AFFECTS PARCELS 2 and 3: Annual maintenance assessments, special
maintenance assessments penalties, administrative assessments
and interest or costs unpaid which ray have been levied or assessed
by willowbrook hill condominiLITIS ho: eaters association.

5.

AFFECTS PARCEL 1: A Deed of Trust, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH,
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, RAY M. MAAG as Trustor, to secure
payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of $65,000.00
with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to UTAH VALLEY
BANK, as Trustee, in favor of UTAH VALLEY BANK, as Beneficiary,
recorded May 11, 1979 as Entry No. 18090 of Official Records.

^

6.

said property,
HELEN GRAY, in
October 3, 1978
Official Records.

Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals, or transmission
lines new existing over, under, or across said property.
* *** * *** *

mntersigned:

sulfating Officer or Agent

The Title Guarantee Company

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
1.

Definition of Terms
The following terms when used in this policy mean:
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "insured"
also includes ( i ) the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage and each successor in ownership of such indebtedness (reserving,
however, ail rights and defenses as to any such successor who acquires the
indebtedness by operation of law as distinguished from purchase including,
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the
Company would have had against the successor's transferor), and further
includes (ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an
insurer or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether named as an
insured herein or not. and (iii) the parties designated in paragraph 2 (a)
of these Conditions and Stipulations.
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage hereunder.
( c ) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge nr
notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public
records.
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in Schedule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real
property; provided, however, the term "land" does not include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in
Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting
streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein
shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the
land is insured by this policy.
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security
instrument.
(f) "public records": those records which by law impart construelive notice of matters relating to said land.
I 2, ( a ) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition of Title
J
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of, an
['Insured)who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in the land
J described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu
s of foreclosure, or other legal manner which discharges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a corporation, its transferrer of the
ii estate or interest so acquired, provided the transferee is the parent or
I wholly owned subsidiary of the insured; and in favor of any governmental

I

II agency or instrumentality which acquires all or any part of the estate or
I interest pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or
|J guaranteeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided

I that the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, exclusive
Ii of costs, attorneys* fees and expenses which the Company may become
II obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of:
u
(i)
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A:
n
(ii)
the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as defined
jl
in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses of foreII'
closure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured
Ii
mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at the time of
II
acquisition of such estate or interest in the land; or
* 1 (iii) the amount paid by any governmental agency or instrumentality.
i J
if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, in the
J l
acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of its insur11
ance contrail or guaranty.
(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Polity
in favor of an insured so long as such injured retains an esUte or
interest in the land, or hold* an indebtedness secured by a purchase money
mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such
insured shall have liability by reason of covenant* of warranty made by
such insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this policy shall not continue in forte in favor of any
purchaser from such insured of cither said estate or interest or the indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured.
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of Claim to be given
by an Insured Qaimant
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall

provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actiof
or proceedings commenced against such insured, or defenses, restrainir
orders or injunctions interposed against a foreclosure of the insur<
mortgage or a defense interposed against an insured in an action to en/on
a contract for a sale of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgag
or a sale of the estate or interest in said land, to the extent that su<
litigation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or oth
matter insured against by this policy.
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) i
case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restraining order (
injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in case knowledj
shall <ome to an insured hereunder of any claim of title or interest whi<
is adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insure
mortgage, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for whit
the G>mpany may be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) if title to ti
estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, is r
jected as unmarketable. If such prompt notice shall not be given to ti
Company, then as to such insured all liability of the Company shall cei!
and terminate in regard to the matter or matters for which such prom]
notice is required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in c
case prejudice the rights of any such insured under this policy unless ti
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the c
tent of such prejudice.
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute ar
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do u
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to esublu
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, i
insured, and the Company may take any appropriate anion under ti
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and sha
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy.
( d ) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or intc
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this polic
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in i
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order.
( e ) In all cases where the policy permits or requires the Company 1
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, tl
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecu
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals thereii
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insure
for such purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, such insured sha
f;ive the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, i
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecutir
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall srimbur
such insured for any expense so incurred.
4. Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action
In addition to the no J ices required under paragraph 3(b) of the
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or darna^
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall i
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage sha
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insurt
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnish©
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate ax
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage.
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise, «*ttle for or t
the name w an insured claimant any claim insured against or to term ina
allliahility and obligations of the Company hereunder by^.^iyjjQg.j
tendering payment oj thc__amount oCJnsurajnce. under this polio* togcth
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred up to the time i
such payment or tender" of payment, by the insured claimant ax
authorized |>y the Company. In case loss or damage is claimed__^ridcr th
policy by an insured, the Company shall have thcCfjirther option]?
purchase MUJI jjiujL-htcdncss for the amount owing thereon together wji
alf costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligate
hereunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebtedness herein provided; the owner of such indebtedness shall transfer smd assii.
said indebtedness and the mortgage and any collateral securing the sat:
to the Company upon payment therefor as herein provided.
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ecd the least of
i)
the actual loss of the insured claimant, or
11)
the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A. or. if applicant,
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof, or
(in) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage
as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the tune the lo&sjpr
damage insured against hereunder^occurs, together with interest
thereon.
~ "
(b) The Company will pzyt in addition to any loss insured against by
is policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation carried on by
r Company for such insured, and all costs, attorney' fees and expenses
litigation carried on b> such insured with the written authorization of
c Company.
(c) When HabiJity^riaxJ>een definitely fixed in accordance *ith tin:
indtttons of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 3*>
lys thereafter.
Limitation of Liability
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this polity <a) if the
jOmganj, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or
ncumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or thv hen
"f the insured mortgage", as insured, within a reasonable.time after receipt
>f such notice; (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a final
letcrmination by i court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all
tppeals therefrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured
nortgage, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof, or (c) for
iability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit
withourpnor written consent of the Company.

iii.l< »»i» .in'\<» M K i m l by the insured fit'»ri/*.i/*t
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N Hdmt'i f»j .my amount the < ottipttiy m<y y.iy umfer any , *#lic>
insutin.: J .»• »itg.igc lirtcafler cxemud l»y an insured sshith is a charre or
Iirn on ll« i sUle or interest descnlxd oi referred in m Schedule A. znd
the amount so paid shall In- deemed .i payment coder this policy
10.

Subrogation U|K>n Paytticitf or Sittlrinrnt

Whem-ser the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all
right of subrogation shall \est in the Company unaffected, by any act of
the insured claimant, except that the owner of the indebtedness secured by
the insured mortgage may release or substitute the personal liability of any
debtoi or gu.uantor, or extend or otherwise modif) the terms of payment,
or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured
mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any claim ai
title ttr interr*st ad\i rsr to the title to the tstate or interest or the priority
of the Inn of the injured mortgage and does not result in any loss of
priority of the IICT of the insured mortgage. The Company shall be
subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which such
insured claimant would have had ag3inst any person or property in respect
to smh claim had this policy not been issued, and it requested by the
Company, such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights
and remedies again*t any person or property necessary in order to perfect
such right of subrogation and .shall permit the Company to use the name
of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such
rights or remedies If the payment does not cover the loss of such insured
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies
in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount of said loss, but
such subrogation shall be in subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss
of priority should result from any act of such insured claimant, sjch act
shall not void this policy, but the Gimpany, in that event, shall be re8. Reduction of Liability
quired to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of the im(a) All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs,
pairment of the right of subrogation
attorneys' fees and expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro
unto; provided, however, such payments, prior to the acquisition of title*
11. Liability Limited to this Policy
to said estate or interest as provided in paragraph 2(a) of these CondiThis instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments,
tions and Stipulations, shall not reduce pro tanto the amount of the intf any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract
surance afforded hereunder except to the extent that such payments reduce
between the insured and the Company.
the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release of the
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of
insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as
the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting
provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof.
such claim, shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipu(b) The .liability, of the Company shall not be increased by additional
lations of this policy.
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, except as to
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage mi secured""
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made exceptor
thereby..
"""""" "
-—-—---—-----------—-—
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President,
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorsea Vkc President, titer Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating orricer
ment of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in which
or authorized signatory of the Company.
case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of
12. Nonces, Where Sent
the Company.
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in
9. Liability Noncumulattve
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to
it at its Home Office, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of

V

s

V
U
C

a
u
3

to u

S-B

**$

G

H O S
Ji u

<•» e

o

o

E
C5

CQ

